Modern information technologies have fundamentally changed how information is disseminated in …nancial markets. Using the staggered implementation of the EDGAR system in 1993-1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we …nd evidence that internet dissemination of corporate information increases information production by corporate outsiders. Speci…cally, trades by individual investors in a stock become more informative about future stock returns after the stock becomes subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR.
Introduction
A well-functioning securities market requires that a broad base of investors have access to corporate information and process such information to promote price e¢ ciency and facilitate capital formation. The advent of modern information technologies has dramatically changed how information is disseminated in …nancial markets by making a large amount of information available to a broad base of …nancial market participants in real time at low costs. Investors nowadays can get immediate access to corporate disclosures as well as other market participants'opinions disseminated through the internet to gain insights into …rms'fundamental value. In the past few decades, a series of regulatory changes have been made to make use of modern information technologies to improve the accessibility of information to the public. For example, the SEC launched the EDGAR system in 1993 to move corporate disclosure from the print era to the digital age, and in 2013 the SEC allowed public companies to use social media sites to announce key information to
investors. Yet, despite the dramatic changes brought about by modern information technologies in the dissemination of information, the e¤ects of modern information technologies on information production by market participants remain underexplored.
Modern information dissemination technologies can have two opposite e¤ects on information production by corporate outsiders. On the one hand, more timely and extensive dissemination of information facilitated by modern information technologies may crowd out information production by market participants. This may arise because of at least three reasons. First, when information is widely disseminated (i.e., more investors become informed about the information), prices may reveal more information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) . Since information processing takes time, the advantage of becoming an information processor decreases, resulting in reduced intensity of information processing activities (e.g., Dugast and Foucalt, 2017) . Second, since widely disseminated public information can serve as a coordinating device for investors' beliefs, greater dissemina-1 tion of information may cause investors to overweight public information and underweight private information. This may reduce stock price e¢ ciency when the precision of private information is high (Morris and Shin, 2002; Amador and Weill, 2010) . For example, Shiller (2006) argues that mass dissemination of information by the media may negatively impact the e¢ ciency of asset prices by creating similar thinking among large groups of people, causing "an avoidance of individual assessment of quantitative data". Third, the availability of large amounts of information may create an information overload problem (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001 ; Shapiro and Varian, 1999) , reducing the attention allocated to information processing. Relatedly, when information is widely disseminated because of technological progresses, the marginal recipient of information might be less able to process it correctly (D'Avolio, Gildo, and Shleifer, 2002). These considerations suggest that the advent of modern information technologies may dampen the incentive to produce information and therefore reduce pricing e¢ ciency.
On the other hand, there could be a crowding-in e¤ect in that greater dissemination of information and the ensuing decline in information acquisition costs may induce greater intensity of information production by market participants. This may arise because, other things equal, the net pro…t information producers derive from producing information increases as the cost of information production declines (see, e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994) . As Verrecchia (1982) argues, "[a]s technological improvements permit more information to be obtained at the same cost, traders'increased information acquisition results in prices revealing more information." Thus, greater dissemination of information facilitated by modern information technologies may increase the incentives of market participants to produce information and, as a result, improve pricing e¢ ciency.
Therefore, the net e¤ect of modern information technologies on information production is ultimately an empirical question. In this paper, we investigate this question by exploiting the staggered implementation of the EDGAR system in 1993-1996 as a shock to informa-tion dissemination technologies. Before the implementation of EDGAR in 1993, publicly traded corporations had to transmit multiple paper copies of …lings to the SEC, and the three public reference rooms of the SEC (in Washington DC, New York, and Chicago) were the ultimate sources of these …lings. The SEC introduced the EDGAR system in February 1993 to enable companies to …le electronically to facilitate the dissemination of information to the public in a timely manner. Importantly, the SEC required that all public companies began …ling to EDGAR in 10 discrete groups, with companies in the …rst group starting to …le on EDGAR in April 1993 and companies in the last group starting in May 1996.
Thus, the staggered nature of the implementation of the EDGAR system provides a set of counterfactuals for how information production would have changed in the absence of a change in information dissemination technologies and so allows us to disentangle the e¤ect of information technologies on information production from other confounding factors.
In this paper, we focus on information production by two groups of market participants, namely individual investors and sell-side …nancial analysts, for two reasons. First, both individual investors and sell-side analysts play the role of information producers in the …nancial markets. Speci…cally, there is growing evidence suggesting that individual investors produce information about stocks (e.g., Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman, 2012; Tetlock, 2013, 2017) . 1 There is also a large literature on the role of sell-side …nancial analysts as information intermediaries in the stock market (see, e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001 , for a comprehensive review of this literature). Second, for both groups,
we can directly observe their behavior at a relatively high frequency, which enables us to construct proxies of information production around speci…c points in time. In particular,
we use the trading data from a large discount brokerage database (the LDB dataset) used by Barber and Odean (2000) and analyst forecasts data from I/B/E/S database. 2 More important for our purposes, the LDB dataset allows us to identify investors with access to the internet who likely bene…t directly from the EDGAR shock.
Using a comprehensive set of …rms covered in the phase-in schedule of the EDGAR system, we …nd evidence suggesting that the crowding-in e¤ect dominates the crowdingout e¤ect for both individual investors and sell-side analysts. Speci…cally, we …nd that individual investors'net buying following an earnings announcement of a stock becomes more informative about future stock returns after the stock becomes subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR. The economic magnitude is non-trivial. For example, a one-standarddeviation increase in net buying by individual investors during the 20 trading days postannouncement is associated with 1:649 percentage points higher subsequent 12-month cumulative abnormal returns after the stock becomes an EDGAR …ler than before, which is economically nontrivial considering that the 12-month CAR has a mean of 2:897% and a standard deviation of 49:574 percentage points. Importantly, we are able to identify which investors have access to the internet based on whether they placed a trade through the internet in the past. While internet users account for only 12% of the investors in our sample, the increase in stock return predictability after the EDGAR implementation is driven primarily by trades placed by these investors. These results suggest that the crowding-in e¤ect dominates the crowding-out e¤ect, thereby resulting in more information production by individual investors, especially those with ready access to information on the internet.
Turning to sell-side analysts, we …nd evidence suggesting that both the amount and the accuracy of information produced by sell-side analysts increase following the EDGAR implementation. Speci…cally, the number of analysts covering a …rm increases and the forecast accuracy of analysts improves after the …rm becomes subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR. In terms of economic magnitudes, the average …rm experiences an increase of 0:234 analysts post-EDGAR, which is large considering that the mean and standard deviation of the number of analysts covering a …rm are 2:488 and 3:917, respectively.
Similarly, the average …rm experiences an increase of 0:00119 in analysts'forecast accuracy, representing 13:2% (1:5%) of the mean (standard deviation) of the variable. Perhaps more important, stock market responses to analysts'revisions become signi…cantly stronger after the …rm becomes an EDGAR …ler, suggesting that the market perceives analyst research as more informative. These results are consistent with the crowding-in e¤ect dominating the crowding-out e¤ect for sell-side analysts.
We conduct several additional tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, we include cohort-speci…c time trends as additional controls in the regressions. In this case, the identi…cation of the e¤ects of EDGAR implementation comes from whether the implementation leads to deviations from preexisting cohort-speci…c trends. We …nd that the observed e¤ects continue to hold with the inclusion of these time trends. Second, our results are robust to rede…ning the post-EDGAR period for the …rst four groups of …rms to start from January 1994 when the EDGAR system became publicly available to internet users without additional charges. Third, we conduct a placebo test using a period preceding the actual EDGAR implementation. We …nd insigni…cant changes in information production around these pseudo-events, alleviating the concern that the observed e¤ects may be driven by unobserved characteristics that are generally correlated with both the relative timing of EDGAR implementation and changes in information production. Last, to address the concern that assignment to groups is not random, we construct a control sample using a propensity-score matching approach. Speci…cally, for each …rm that switches from being a non-…ler to an EDGAR …ler in a given month, we identify a non-switching …rm that has statistically the same size, book-to-market, pro…tability, leverage, R&D, and etc.
We …nd that the above results continue to hold, suggesting that the observed e¤ects are not driven by …rm characteristics that are associated with assignment to groups.
Last but not least, we examine the e¤ect of EDGAR implementation on stock price e¢ ciency. Using various measures of pricing e¢ ciency, namely stock price synchronicity (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) , the absolute value of stock return autocorrelation, and the standard deviation of the pricing error of Hasbrouck (1993), we …nd evidence that EDGAR implementation improves stock price e¢ ciency. This result suggests that internet dissemination of corporate information not only increases information production by market participants, but also improves pricing e¢ ciency.
Our paper is the …rst in the literature to provide causal evidence on the e¤ect of the EDGAR system on information production. As the …rst paper to exploit the staggered timing of the implementation of the EDGAR system, our study highlights the impacts of technological advances on information dissemination and production in …nancial markets.
Our …ndings have important policy implications. Government regulations that aim to promote the availability of fundamental information, such as earnings reports and other corporate releases, to a broad base of investors in real time are likely to enhance the resource allocation role of …nancial markets by increasing the supply of information by corporate outsiders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related research as well as background information on the implementation of EDGAR. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and two types of costly information, namely raw information, which is noisy but can be immediately traded upon, and processed information, which is more precise but takes time to process. They argue that when raw information is precise enough, lowering the cost of raw information leads to more trades on raw information and reduces the value of processed information. In this case, the decline in the cost of raw information due to technological advances can reduce the incentive to produce information and hence lower the informativeness of prices in the long run. On the other hand, Verrecchia (1982) contends that as information acquisition becomes less costly, the amount of costly diverse information investors acquire increases, which leads to more informative prices. Thus, whether modern information technologies facilitate or dampen information production is an empirical question. By exploiting the staggered implementation of the EDGAR system as plausibly exogenous shocks to information technologies, our paper provides evidence suggesting that greater and broader dissemination of fundamental information facilitated by modern information dissemination technologies positively impacts information production by market participants. Our …ndings are consistent with the crowding-in e¤ect dominating the crowding-out e¤ect, highlighting technological advances in information dissemination as a contributing factor to the informational e¢ ciency of stock prices. 
The implementation of the EDGAR system
Prior to the implementation of EDGAR in 1993, public …rms had to transmit multiple paper copies of …lings to the SEC by mail, by courier, or by personal delivery. These paper copies of …lings would then be …led in the SEC public reference rooms for public viewing after being reviewed by the SEC examiners. Thus, the three locations of the public reference rooms (in Washington DC, New York, and Chicago) are the ultimate source of corporate disclosures for the investing public. Since the paper …lings can be inspected by one reader at a time, the limited availability of paper copies for each …ling (typically one or two copies at each location) makes it hard for the information to reach a large To meet the objective of providing information to the public in a timely and e¢ cient manner, the SEC developed an automated system, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analy-sis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, for electronic submission of company …lings. The main goal of EDGAR was to enable companies to …le electronically to facilitate the dissemination of information to the public in real time. By disseminating information through the internet, the EDGAR system increases the accessibility of corporate …lings and thus signi…cantly reduces corporate outsiders'information acquisition costs. Moreover, corporate outsiders can more readily process information in electronic …lings than in paper …lings, e.g., by using the search function to locate speci…c information in an electronic document.
On February 23, 1993 , the SEC issued rules requiring corporate …lings be transmitted electronically to EDGAR. These rules speci…ed a phase-in schedule for all public …rms to begin …ling to EDGAR. Speci…cally, the rules categorized public …rms into 10 groups and each group was phased in at di¤erent times. 5 Companies in the …rst group, i.e., Group CF-01, had to commence mandated electronic …ling to EDGAR in April 1993, and those in the last group, i.e., Group CF-10, became EDGAR …lers in May 1996. The time-lapse between the starting date of one group and that of the next group ranges from three to six months. Figure 1 plots the number of …rms that are subject to mandatory …ling through EDGAR in each point in time from January 1993 through December 1996. Appendix A provides a timetable for the implementation of the EDGAR system.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Data and Summary Statistics
We retrieve the list of …rms on the phase-in schedule for the implementation of the EDGAR system from Appendix B of SEC Release No. 33-6977 (released on February 23, 1993).
6 5 We …led a Freedom of Information Act request to the SEC for information on how companies are assigned to di¤erent groups. The SEC responded that their sta¤ "conducted a thorough search of the SEC's various systems of records, but did not locate or identify any information responsive to [the] request." 6 We code a …rm as being subject to mandatory …ling to EDGAR based on the phase-in schedule in SEC Release No. 33-6977. According to the Release, the SEC may, in its discretion, grant or deny a request
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The list provides the …rm name, CIK, and group number (from 1 through 10). We match the companies on the list to Compustat by CIK and company name. We are able to match 5; 212 …rms that are on the phase-in schedule and have …nancial information available in Compustat as of January 31, 1993, i.e., the month-end immediately before the release of the rules regarding EDGAR implementation. For most of our analysis, we focus on quarterly earnings announcements since they are accompanied by mandatory disclosure of quarterly …nancial results. Our sample period starts in April 1991 (i.e., two years before the starting date of the …rst batch of EDGAR …lers) and ends in May 1998 (i.e., two years after the starting date of the last batch).
We obtain trading data from the large discount brokerage database used by Barber and Odean (2000), which cover the trades by 77; 795 households between 1991 and 1996.
The dataset is particularly appropriate for assessing the impact of internet dissemination of information on individual investors'trading decisions, because about a quarter of the investors in the dataset reside in California, which was one of the states with the highest rates of internet penetration in the early years of the internet (e.g., Greenstein, 1998).
Therefore, individual investors in our sample may be more tech savvy and better positioned to take advantage of the internet technology than the average individual investor in a general sample.
We use the informativeness of individual investors'trades about subsequent stock returns to capture their information production activities. If investors produce information about a stock that is not yet incorporated into stock prices and trade on such information, their trades in the stock should be positively correlated with the subsequent stock returns.
We focus on individuals'trades in a 20-trading-day window immediately following quarterly earnings announcements. 7 Since earnings announcements are followed by the release by a …rm to participate in a phase-in group other than the group assigned in the phase-in schedule. It is worth noting that if the actual implementation date of a …rm is di¤erent from that speci…ed in the phase-in schedule, it will result in misclassi…cations in our coding and bias against …nding signi…cant results. 7 Ideally, one would like to look at a window immediately following the release of quarterly reports (i.e., 10-Qs). However, the …ling dates of these reports are not readily available before the implementation of of …nancial information that is critical for assessing the fundamental value of the …rms (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994), we expect that investors should be especially active in processing such information when it is released. We calculate net buying by individual investors during the …rst 20 trading days following an earnings announcement (i.e., from day +1 to +20, with day 0 being the earnings announcement date) as the total number of shares bought by individual investors during the period minus the total number of shares sold by individual investors during the same period normalized by the total number of shares out- We compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following the trading window (i.e., starting from day +21) as the sum of daily DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns. We consider two holdings horizons, i.e., 6 months (i.e., 126 trading days from day +21 to +146) and 12 months (i.e., 252 trading days from day +21 to +272). We focus on relatively long holding horizons to reduce the noise in stock prices due to non-informational reasons such as temporary price pressure and liquidity e¤ects. If information disseminated through EDGAR attracts investor attention and increases uninformed trading by these investors (e.g., Odean, 2001, 2008) , one may expect short-run, but not long-run return predictabilities of investors'trades. Thus, focusing on relatively long windows to measure stock returns provides a cleaner test of the information story. Panel A of Table 1 shows that individual net buying has a mean of 0:034% and a standard deviation of 3:6 percentage points. The 6-month (12-month) cumulative abnormal returns starting from the 21st day EDGAR, which is why we focus on a window following earnings announcements. To guide our choice of the length of the window, we retrieve the …ling dates of 10-Qs of our sample …rms that are available on EDGAR and compute the time lag between a quarterly earnings announcement and the …ling of the corresponding 10-Q report. The time lag has a median of 17 calendar days and a 95th percentile of 29 calendar days, suggesting that the release of quarterly reports is likely to occur within a 20-trading-day window immediately following earnings announcements for the vast majority of our sample …rms. Since EDGAR makes information publicly accessible through the internet, it may have a direct impact on information production by investors who have access to the internet.
We make use of the information on the channel through which investors place trades (i.e., by phone or internet) to classify investors into two categories. Internet users are those that placed a trade through the internet in the past and non-users are otherwise. About 12:049% of the investor-month observations are classi…ed as internet users. 8 We then calculate net buying by internet users and non-users separately. The mean post-announcement net buying by internet users is 0:008% and that by non-users is 0:025%.
We retrieve quarterly earnings forecasts made within 90 days of the quarterly earnings report date from I/B/E/S. We construct three measures to capture information production Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the analyst sample. The mean and standard deviation of the number of analysts following a …rm are 2:488 and 3:917, respectively. The mean and standard deviation of forecast accuracy are 0:009 and 0:079, respectively. The mean revision is 0:184% and the mean revision CAR is 0:232%.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
4 Empirical Results
Informativeness of individual investors'trades
Since the implementation of the EDGAR system changes how corporate information is disseminated in the …nancial markets, we focus on the informativeness of individual investors'
trades following the release of corporate information. As mentioned above, earnings announcements are accompanied by the release of …nancial information, which is of crucial importance to investors in evaluating the fundamental value of the …rms (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Therefore, trades during the period following earnings announcements are likely to be motivated by informational reasons rather than other considerations. 9 If greater and broader information dissemination enables individual investors to produce information that is not yet incorporated into prices (i.e., when the crowding-in e¤ect dominates), their trades in a …rm's stock following earnings announcements should become more informative about future stock price movements after the …rm becomes an EDGAR …ler.
On the other hand, if the crowding-out e¤ect dominates the crowding-in e¤ect, we should expect that individual investors' trades become less informative following the EDGAR implementation.
We construct a …rm-quarter panel and run the following regression:
where CAR i;q is the cumulative DGTW-adjusted abnormal returns of stock i during a 6-or 12-month window starting from the 21st trading day after quarter q's earnings announcement; N etbuy i;q is the net buying by individual investors in stock i during the 20-trading-day period immediately following the earnings announcement, P ost-EDGAR i;q is an indicator that equals one if the …rm-quarter is subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR;
c i and c q are …rm and quarter …xed e¤ects, respectively; and X i;q is a vector of lagged …rm characteristics that are commonly used to predict stock returns, including …rm size, book-to-market ratio, past stock return, ROA, leverage, and so on. The …rm …xed e¤ects and quarter …xed e¤ects control for time-invariant di¤erences across treatment and control …rms and aggregate ‡uctuations in stock returns over time, respectively. Since the timevarying …rm characteristics are likely a¤ected by the EDGAR implementation, controlling for these variables might attenuate the total impact of the implementation on information production by corporate outsiders. We therefore run all of our regressions with and without these time-varying …rm characteristics. We cluster standard errors by …rm and by quarter (Petersen, 2009 ). The coe¢ cient on the interaction term combining N etbuy i;q and P ost-EDGAR i;q captures the incremental e¤ect of …lings to EDGAR on the informativeness of individuals' trades. If the crowding-in e¤ect dominates the crowding-out e¤ect, we should expect the coe¢ cient to be positive and signi…cant. On the other hand, if the crowding-out e¤ect dominates the crowding-in e¤ect, we should expect a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the interaction term.
It is useful to note that because of the staggering of the di¤erent groups over time, …rms in the sample are both treatment and control …rms. For example, …rms in Groups CF-02 through CF-10 serve as the control …rms when …rms in Group CF-01 switch from being non-EDGAR …lers to EDGAR …lers in April 1993, and …rms in Group CF-01 as well as those in Groups CF-03 through CF-10 serve as the control …rms when …rms in Group CF-02 become subject to mandatory …lings to EDGAR in July 1993. Thus, the staggered implementation of the EDGAR system mitigates the concern that the phase-in schedule may coincide with other …rm-level shocks that may a¤ect information production by corporate outsiders. In other words, for an omitted variable to explain our …ndings, it would have to a¤ect di¤erent groups of companies at discrete points in time as speci…ed in the phase-in schedule. Also, it is unlikely that the phase-in schedule is designed in such a way that it anticipates changes in information production up to three years into the future, which casts doubt on reverse-causality stories.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the regression results for all trades by our sample of individual investors. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term, N etbuy P ost-EDGAR, is positive and signi…cant in all speci…cations. 10 Notably, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates is little changed when we control for …rm-level characteristics, suggesting that the e¤ect is not explained by observable di¤erences in …rm characteristics. The stability of the coe¢ -cients also suggests that unobservable selection is likely to be low (Oster, 2017) . In terms of economic magnitudes, model 4 shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in net buying by individual investors during the 20 trading days post-announcement is associated with 1:649 percentage points higher subsequent 12-month cumulative abnormal returns after the stock becomes an EDGAR …ler than before, which is economically nontrivial considering that the 12-month CAR has a mean of 2:897% and a standard deviation of 49:574 percentage points. This result provides evidence that EDGAR implementation increases the likelihood that individuals'trades are based on information not yet incorporated into prices, suggesting that the crowding-in e¤ect dominates the crowding-out e¤ect.
11 10 It is worth noting that the coe¢ cient on P ost-EDGAR itself is negative and signi…cant, indicating that, for the subset of stocks with zero net buying by individual investors (about 1.5% of the sample), the subsequent returns tend to be lower after EDGAR implementation than before. 11 The sum of the coe¢ cients on the interaction term, i.e., N etbuy P ost-EDGAR, and N etbuy is positive and signi…cant in all speci…cations, indicating that individual investors'trades during the post-We exploit heterogeneity across investors in terms of internet access to shed light on the sources of the increase in the informativeness of individual investors' trades after the implementation of the EDGAR system. Panel B of Table 2 replaces net buying by all individual investors with that by internet users and that by non-users separately. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term combining the post-EDGAR indicator and net buying by internet users is positive and signi…cant in all four speci…cations, whereas that combining the post-EDGAR indicator and net buying by non-users is insigni…cant. The di¤erence in the two coe¢ cients is signi…cant at conventional levels when we use 12-month abnormal returns. Thus, although internet users account for a relatively small fraction (i.e., about 12%) of the sample of investors, they account for the bulk of the observed increase in the informativeness of individual investors'trades. This …nding strengthens the interpretation that the EDGAR implementation enables individual investors, especially those with ready access to information on the internet, to acquire and process information. 12, 13 We also examine how the e¤ect of EDGAR implementation on the informativeness of individuals'trades varies across stocks facing di¤erent levels of information asymmetry. If a …rm faces a low level of information asymmetry (e.g., it is heavily covered by …nancial analysts and the news media), the implementation is likely to have a relatively muted effect on the informativeness of individual investors'trades because information about such …rms is available from other sources. On the other hand, the implementation of EDGAR period are based on information not yet incorporated into stock prices. 12 It might be tempting to speculate that since markets must clear, individual investors as a whole gain an informational advantage over other investors such as institutions post-EDGAR. This reasoning, however, is invalid, because our data only cover a subset of individual investors and hence do not allow us to draw conclusions regarding individual investors as a whole. Instead, our evidence suggests that some individual investors, especially those with access to the internet, bene…t from the implementation of the EDGAR system and are able to trade more pro…tably at the expense of other investors that presumably do not have access to the internet. 13 Using EDGAR server logs from 2003 through 2012, Loughran and McDonald (2017) show that the number of requests for 10-Ks through EDGAR is surprisingly low. This …nding, however, does not necessarily invalidate the premise that EDGAR serves as an important conduit of information for investors. As Loughran and McDonald (2017) point out, alternative distribution channels that provide access to repackaged EDGAR …lings have proliferated in more recent years (e.g., FreeEDGAR, EDGAR Online, EdgarScan, SEC Watch, 10-K Wizard, and Capital IQ), which may explain the low magnitude of requests on EDGAR itself during their sample period.
is likely to signi…cantly improve the information environment of …rms that face a high level of information asymmetry in the equity market, i.e., those whose information is otherwise costly to obtain, by increasing the amount of information that investors can access at low costs. We thus expect the e¤ect of EDGAR implementation on the informativeness of individuals'trades to be driven mainly by …rms with a high level of information asymmetry. We use analyst coverage and market capitalization to proxy for the level of information asymmetry. We measure analyst coverage and market cap as of January 31, 1993. We classify a …rm as opaque if the …rm has no analyst coverage and the market capitalization of the …rm is in the bottom quartile. We interact the opaque indicator with the main variables, i.e., N etbuy i;q , P ost-EDGAR i;q , and their interaction term and repeat the regressions.
The results, reported in Panel C of Table 2 , show that the triple interaction term combining N etbuy i;q , P ost-EDGAR i;q , and the opaque indicator is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level in all speci…cations. These …ndings suggest that EDGAR implementation lowers information acquisition costs for investors, especially in stocks facing a high level of information asymmetry. 
Sell-side analyst research
To examine the e¤ect of EDGAR implementation on information production by sell-side …nancial analysts, we conduct two sets of tests. The …rst examines analyst coverage and analyst forecast accuracy at the …rm-quarter level, and the second examines market responses to analyst forecast revisions using analyst-level revision events. Speci…cally, for the …rst test, we construct a …rm-quarter panel and run the following regression:
where Analyst research i;q is either the number of analysts making quarterly forecasts for stock i's quarter q earnings per share or the forecast accuracy of analysts; P ost-EDGAR i;q is an indicator that equals one if the …rm-quarter is subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR;
c i and c q are …rm and quarter …xed e¤ects, respectively; and X i;q 1 is the same set of …rm characteristics used in Eq. (1). We again cluster standard errors by …rm and by quarter (Petersen, 2009) . If the crowding-in e¤ect dominates the crowding-out e¤ect, the coe¢ cient on the P ost-EDGAR indicator should be positive and signi…cant. On the other hand, if the crowding-out e¤ect dominates the crowding-in e¤ect, we should expect a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient.
The results, reported in Table 3 , show that both the number of analysts covering a …rm and the forecast accuracy of analysts increase signi…cantly after the …rm becomes subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR. These results hold regardless of whether we control for …rm size, market-to-book, prior stock return, ROA, and other variables that could be correlated with analysts'research. In terms of economic magnitudes, model 2 shows that the average …rm experiences an increase of 0:234 analysts post-EDGAR, which is large considering that the mean and standard deviation of the number of analysts covering a …rm are 2:488 and 3:917, respectively. Similarly, model 4 shows that the average …rm experiences an increase of 0:00119 in analysts'forecast accuracy, representing 13:2% (1:5%) of the mean (standard deviation) of the variable. It is worth noting that the coe¢ cient estimates are little unchanged when we include …rm-level controls in the regressions, suggesting that the EDGAR implementation schedule is largely independent of time-varying …rm characteristics.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
If …nancial analysts are able to produce more accurate information after a …rm becomes an EDGAR …ler, the market should respond more strongly to analysts'forecasts. Thus, our second set of tests investigates the impact of EDGAR implementation on market responses to analysts'forecast revisions. We estimate the following regression using each revision event as a unit of observation: where CAR i;a;d is the three-day cumulative DGTW-adjusted abnormal returns of stock i around analyst a's forecast revision on day d; Revision i;a;d is the price-scaled changes in analyst a's earnings forecasts for stock i on day d; P ost-EDGAR i;q is an indicator that equals one if the …rm-quarter is subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR; c i;q and c a;q are …rm quarter and analyst quarter …xed e¤ects, respectively. In some speci…cations, we include …rm …xed e¤ects and the same set of …rm characteristics as used in Eqs. (1) and (2) instead of …rm quarter …xed e¤ects. In the most stringent speci…cation, we include both …rm quarter and analyst quarter …xed e¤ects, which completely absorb time-varying …rm attributes (e.g., prior performance, information asymmetry, and ownership structure) and time-varying analyst attributes (e.g., experience of the analyst, areas of expertise, and broker resources). The inclusion of …rm quarter …xed e¤ects forces identi…cation of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term from variations across analysts covering a given …rm-quarter, and that of analyst quarter …xed e¤ects forces identi…cation from variations across …rms covered by a given analyst in a given quarter. Standard errors are three-way clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation within …rm, analyst, and quarter. Table 4 reports the results. In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms are positive and highly signi…cant, suggesting that the market perceives analysts research as more informative after the …rm becomes an EDGAR …ler. The economic magnitudes are large: for example, model 4 shows that for a one-standard-deviation increase in the magnitude of the revisions, the three-day CAR is 0:414 percentage points (= 0:00723 0:573) higher after EDGAR implementation than before. This result provides evidence that the market views analysts'research as more informative after the EDGAR implementation.
Overall, the two sets of regressions in Tables 3 and 4 show consistent patterns in the e¤ect of EDGAR implementation on information production by sell-side analysts. These results suggest that greater dissemination of information facilitated by modern information technologies increases both the quantity and quality of sell-side analyst research.
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[Insert Table 4 about here]
Additional tests
In this subsection, we perform a number of additional tests to assess the robustness of the main results.
Controlling for group-speci…c time trends. It is possible that time trends in our outcome variables may be di¤erent across groups that become subject to …lings to EDGAR at discrete points in time. To account for this possibility, we include group-speci…c time trends as additional controls in the regressions (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The identi…cation of the e¤ects of EDGAR implementation thus comes from whether the implementation leads to deviations from preexisting group-speci…c trends. We report the regression results using the most stringent speci…cation for each test, i.e., Eqs.
(1) through (3), in Table 5 . The results show that the e¤ects of EDGAR implementation on various outcomes continue to be positive and signi…cant and the magnitude of the e¤ects is little changed by the inclusion of these trends. These results suggest that the observed e¤ects are not driven by di¤erential time trends across groups.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Ease of access to EDGAR …lings. When the EDGAR system …rst got started, corporate …lings on EDGAR were available electronically through Mead Data Central, a commercial data vendor, which provided access to the information for a fee (New York Times, 1993). The Internet Multicasting Service, a nonpro…t organization, secured a National Science Foundation grant to New York University, which made EDGAR …lings publicly accessible to internet users without additional charges starting from January 17, 1994. Therefore, for the …rst four groups of companies, there is an interim period when the …lings are electronically …led but are available at a cost, which may limit the accessibility 23 of these …lings. We thus rede…ne the P ost-EDGAR indicator for the …rst four groups to take the value of one if the …rm-quarter is after January 17, 1994 and zero otherwise, and create a new variable, Interim, which takes the value of one if the …rm-quarter falls in the interim period for the …rst four groups of companies and zero otherwise. About 1% of the …rm-quarters in the sample are classi…ed as being in the interim period. Table 6 reports the results when we replace the original P ost-EDGAR indicator with the rede…ned P ost-EDGAR indicator and the Interim indicator. The results show that the e¤ects of the rede…ned P ost-EDGAR indicator on various outcomes continue to be positive and signi…cant and the magnitude of the e¤ects is slightly larger than that obtained using the baseline speci…cations. Interestingly, we …nd positive, although statistically insigni…cant, e¤ects of the interim period on our information production proxies. For example, model 2 shows that the number of analysts covering a …rm in the …rst four groups increases by 0:205 when the …rm moves from the pre-EDGAR period to the interim period.
The insigni…cant results may be due to the low statistical power of the test given that only about 1% of the observations are in the interim period.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Placebo tests. To strengthen the interpretation of the results, we repeat the tests using a period preceding the actual EDGAR implementation. We de…ne pseudo-events as occurring two years prior to the actual implementation. We restrict the sample for this test to …rm-quarters during a four-year window before the actual implementation, thus none of the …rm-quarters switches during the four-year period. The P ost-EDGAR indicator takes the value of one if the …rm-quarter is in the two-year period after the pseudo-event dates
and zero if it is in the two-year period before. This falsi…cation test helps rule out alternative explanations for our results. For example, there could be unobservable characteristics that are generally correlated with both the relative timing of the implementation and an 24 increase in information production. In this case, we should expect signi…cant increase in information production around these pseudo-events. Table 7 reports the results from the placebo tests. The coe¢ cients on our variables of interest are generally close to zero and statistically insigni…cant. For example, the coe¢ cient estimates on the P ost-EDGAR indicator are 0:055 and 0:00002, respectively, in the regressions of the number of analysts and forecast accuracy, as compared to 0:234 and 0:00119 in the baseline speci…cations in Table 3 . These results show that there is little change in information production in the absence of shocks to information dissemination, suggesting that the observed e¤ects are not driven by omitted variables that are generally correlated with both the relative timing of the implementation and an increase in information production.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Propensity-score matching. To address the concern about nonrandom assignment of groups, we use a propensity-score matching approach. We …rst construct a sample of control …rms that are statistically identical to …rms that switch from being a non-…ler to an EDGAR …ler. Speci…cally, for each month in which a group of …rms start to become subject to mandatory …lings to EDGAR, we create a cohort consisting of …rms that switch from being a non-…ler to an EDGAR …ler in that month (i.e., the treatment …rms) and …rms that do not switch in that month or in the 18 months before or 18 months after that month (i.e., the control …rms). Note that a control …rm can be an EDGAR …ler or a non-…ler as long as the …rm retains that status during the 37-month period around the month under consideration. We then stack the 10 cohorts into a panel and run a logistic regression to predict whether a …rm becomes treated. We use a comprehensive list of …rm characteristics, including the full set of control variables in our main regression as well as industry …xed e¤ects and cohort …xed e¤ects, as the explanatory variables. We then use the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, from this logit estimation and perform a one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching with replacement. Panel A of Table 8 reports the pre-and post-matching …rm characteristics for treatment and control …rms. We cluster standard errors by …rm and by cohort. Treatment stocks on average have lower capital expenditures than control …rms pre-matching, but the two groups of stocks do not di¤er signi…cantly in other characteristics. 15 After matching, none of the matching variables are signi…cantly di¤erent between the treatment and matched control stocks. Hence, the matching process seems e¤ective in removing any meaningful observable di¤erences between the two groups of stocks.
We compare the change in various information production proxies between treatment …rms and matched control …rms. We use the four quarters immediately before the switching event (i.e., quarters 4 through 1, with quarter 0 being the switching quarter) as the pre-period and a four-quarter period after the switching event (i.e., quarters +3 through +6) as the post-period. We skip the …rst two quarters immediately following the event to allow time for market participants to start processing information.
To test whether individual investors' trades in treatment stocks, relative to those in matched control stocks, become more informative about subsequent stock returns after the implementation than before, we pool the treatment and matched control stocks and regress the subsequent 12-month cumulative abnormal returns on net buying by individual investors, an indicator for treatment stocks, an indicator for whether the observation is from the post-event period, and interaction terms for each of these variables, as well as …rm …xed e¤ects and quarter …xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the triple interaction term is the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator comparing the change in trade informativeness between treatment and matched control …rms. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the coe¢ cient on the triple interaction term is 0:673 and signi…cant at the 5% level, which is comparable to the magnitude obtained in our baseline speci…cation in Table 2 .
We conduct similar tests for analyst research. Panel B of Table 8 shows that, compared to matched control stocks, treatment stocks experience an increase in the number of analysts, forecast accuracy, and market responses to forecast revisions after the …rms become EDGAR …lers. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences for these outcome variables are again signi…cant at conventional levels with magnitudes similar to those obtained in the baseline speci…cations in Tables 3 and 4 . These results lend further support to our …ndings that greater information dissemination facilitated by modern information technologies increases information production by corporate outsiders.
[Insert Table 8 represents a shock to the dissemination of these …rms'disclosures. Therefore, we include these transitional …lers in the main tests. Nevertheless, to mitigate the concern that these …rms drive the observed e¤ects, we conduct a robustness check by excluding …rms assigned to Group CF-01. Table 9 reports the regression results using the most stringent speci…cation for each Table 3 .
[Insert Table 9 suggesting that the current stock price re ‡ects more information about future earnings. We compute stock return autocorrelation for a stock-month as the …rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the daily stock return series. A lower absolute value of return autocorrelation implies more e¢ cient stock pricing (e.g., Lo and MacKinlay, 1988 ).
To construct the pricing error measure, we …rst decompose the log transaction price p t as p t = m t + s t ; where m t is a random walk process representing the market e¢ cient price conditional on all public information available at t; s t is a zero-mean covariancestationary process capturing the transient deviation of the transaction price from the e¢ cient price due to factors such as inventory control by market makers, price discreteness, and temporary liquidity e¤ects. The standard deviation of the pricing error, denoted as (s t ), captures the extent to which the transaction price deviates from the e¢ cient price and thus can be interpreted as an inverse measure of market e¢ ciency. We follow Boehmer and Kelly (2009) to use a vector autoregressive (VAR) system to obtain estimates for s t .
We use intraday transaction data from NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) data from 1993-1998 and Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) data from 1991-1992. We exclude stock-months with less than 200 transactions. We use trades and quotes during regular hours and discard overnight price changes. For all transaction, we only include transactions with positive prices, positive sizes, and positive bid and ask prices with bid minus ask being positive and less than 25% of the mid quote. To make the measure comparable across stocks and over time, we normalize the standard deviation of the pricing error by the standard deviation of the log transaction price and use this ratio as an inverse measure of pricing e¢ ciency, i.e., PricingError = (s t )= (p t ). We construct the pricing error measure at a monthly frequency.
To test the e¤ect of the implementation of EDGAR on stock pricing e¢ ciency, we run the following regression:
where InverseE¢ ciency i;m is one of the three inverse measures of information e¢ ciency for stock i in month m; P ost-EDGAR i;m is an indicator set to zero before the stock becomes subject to mandatory EDGAR …ling and one afterward; c i and c m are …rm and month …xed e¤ects, respectively; and X i;q 1 is the same set of …rm characteristics used in Eq. (1). We cluster standard errors by …rm and by month. If EDGAR implementation increases pricing e¢ ciency, we expect a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the post-EDGAR indicator.
The results, reported in Table 10 , show that the coe¢ cient on the post-EDGAR indicator is negative and statistically signi…cant across all six speci…cations, suggesting that EDGAR implementation leads to more e¢ cient stock pricing. The economic magnitude is nontrivial: for example, since the mean (standard deviation) of pricing error is 0:131 (0:122), model 6 shows that pricing error decreases by 6:1% (6:6%) relative to its mean (standard deviation) after the implementation of EDGAR. This …nding is consistent with a positive e¤ect of EDGAR implementation on informational e¢ ciency. Thus, the implementation of EDGAR not only increases information production by corporate outsiders, but also leads to more e¢ cient stock pricing.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Conclusion
Modern information technologies have greatly facilitated the dissemination of information in …nancial markets. In this paper, we investigate the impact of internet dissemination of corporate disclosures on information production by corporate outsiders, namely individual investors and …nancial analysts. Using the staggered implementation of the EDGAR system in 1993-1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we …nd evidence that greater information dissemination facilitated by modern information technologies increases information production by these two types of market participants. Speci…cally, trades by individual investors in a stock become more informative about future stock returns after the stock becomes subject to mandatory …ling on EDGAR. This e¤ect is driven primarily by investors who have access to the internet. As for …nancial analysts, we …nd that both the amount and accuracy of information produced by sell-side analysts increase following the EDGAR implementation. Also, market responses to analyst revisions become stronger after …rms start to …le electronically on EDGAR. Furthermore, stock pricing ef…ciency improves after a …rm becomes an EDGAR …ler. Overall, these results suggest that advances in information technology that facilitate greater and broader information dissemination improve information production and stock pricing e¢ ciency.
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This paper contributes to our understanding of the e¤ects of modern information technologies on …nancial markets. Our …ndings suggest that regulations that aim at promoting the availability of corporate information to a broad base of investors in real time at low costs are likely to enhance the resource allocation role of …nancial markets by increasing the supply of information by corporate outsiders. Given the profound e¤ects of modern information technologies on stock pricing e¢ ciencies, future research should investigate whether and, if so, how information technologies in ‡uence the real decisions of …rms. shares bought minus the number of shares sold by individual investors as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding during a 20-day window after an earnings announcement. Net buying by internet users [+1, +20] and Net buying by non-users [+1, +20] are similarly defined for individual investors with access to the internet and those without, respectively. We identify an investor as an internet user if she placed a trade through the internet in the past. AbnReturn [+21, +146] and AbnReturn [+21, +272] are cumulative DGTW-characteristics adjusted returns during a 6-and 12-month window starting from the 21st day after an earnings announcement, respectively. # of analysts is the number of analysts making quarterly earnings forecasts in the I/B/E/S database for a stock in a given quarter. Forecast accuracy is negative of the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings per share and the median analyst forecast normalized by stock price (following Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003) . Revision is the difference between two consecutive quarterly earnings forecasts of an analyst for the same stock-quarter scaled by stock price (following Clement and Tse, 2003) . CAR [−1, +1] is the cumulative DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns during a three-day window around an earnings forecast revision by an analyst. Total assets is the book value of assets of the firm. Book-to-market is the book value of common equity divided by the market value of common equity. Prior stock return is the buy-and-hold stock return during the past 12 months skipping the most recent month. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to book value of assets. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. Asset tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Sales growth is the percentage change in quarterly sales from four quarters earlier to the current quarter. CapEx/TA is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. R&D/TA is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Institutional ownership is the number of shares held by institutional investors as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding. All variables are winsorized at the 0.1% and 99.9% levels in order to minimize the effect of outliers. Interim is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm-quarter falls in the interim period, i.e., the time from the starting date of mandated electronic filing to EDGAR to January 16, 1994 , for the first four groups of companies and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are cumulative DGTW-characteristics adjusted returns during a 6-month window starting from the 21st day after an earnings announcement, the number of analysts, forecast accuracy, and the cumulative DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns during a three-day window around analyst revisions, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Numbers in parentheses in the first three columns are t-statistics based on standard errors two-way clustered by firm and quarter, and those in the last column are three-way clustered by firm, quarter, and analyst. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. This table reports regression analysis of information production activities around pseudo EDGAR implementations. We define pseudo-events as occurring 24 months prior to the actual implementation. The dependent variables are cumulative DGTW-characteristics adjusted returns during a 6-month window starting from the 21st day after an earnings announcement, the number of analysts, forecast accuracy, and the cumulative DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns during a three-day window around analyst revisions, respectively. "Post-EDGAR" is an indicator that equals one for firm-quarters that are in the two-year window after the pseudoevent date and zero for firm-quarters that are in the two-year window immediately before the pseudo-event date. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Numbers in parentheses in the first three columns are t-statistics based on standard errors two-way clustered by firm and quarter, and those in the last column are three-way clustered by firm, quarter, and analyst. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. This table reports propensity-score matching diagnostics and the diff-in-diff tests using the propensity-score matched sample. Panel A compares the mean of the matching variables between treatment (i.e., firms that switch from a non-filer to an EDGAR filer in a month) and control (i.e., firms that remain as a filer or non-filer in a 36-month window around the month under consideration) stocks before and after matching. We use the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, from a logit estimation and perform a one-to-one nearest-neighbor match with replacement. Panel B reports the diff-in-diff tests of the impact of EDGAR on information production using the propensity-score matched sample. All variables are defined in Table 1 .
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors two-way clustered by firm and quarter. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. This table reports regression analysis of the impact of EDGAR on various information production measures after excluding firms assigned to Group CF-01 (which consists mostly of transitional filers) on the phase-in schedule. The dependent variables are cumulative DGTWcharacteristics adjusted returns during a 6-month window starting from the 21st day after an earnings announcement, the number of analysts, forecast accuracy, and the cumulative DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns during a three-day window around analyst revisions, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Numbers in parentheses in the first three columns are tstatistics based on standard errors two-way clustered by firm and quarter, and those in the last column are three-way clustered by firm, quarter, and analyst. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. 
